Identifying a clear relationship between rebel group structures and the use of violence faces the challenge that group structures rarely change over time. We exploit the analytical advantage provided by religious holidays to address this issue using the principal-agent framework. Religious holidays serve as a focal point and reduce group coordination costs, but also raise the societal costs of violence. We argue the principal of rebel groups is more sensitive to the increased societal costs than the agents and thereby attempts to restrain the agents from attacking during religious holidays. However, the extent to which these attempts are successful depends on the group’s institutionalization level. We test the theory by first conducting microlevel analysis of Islamic separatist groups in three Southeast Asian countries and then analyzing a cross-sectional sample of Islamic rebel groups. Results show that highly institutionalized groups that have a central command system and control over constituent groups are less likely to attack during long religious holidays than on other days, and vice versa for weakly institutionalized groups.

We investigate the robustness of the Penn effect—the finding that the price level is higher in countries with a higher per capita income—over different samples, measures, and specifications. Testing for the Penn effect has been hampered by the imprecision of the price measures, so that use of different versions of the data set can lead to substantially different results. We find that the price level-income elasticity is fairly consistently estimated across data sets. However, there is some evidence that the relationship is non-linear. For developed economies, the quadratic term implies an inverted U-shaped relationship. Developing economies, on the other hand, display a U-shaped relationship. Estimates of misalignment differ, depending on the choice of specification and data sets. It appears that the Renminbi (RMB) was fairly valued by 2011. In contrast, the RMB’s value was undervalued in 2005, and overvalued in 2014.

How does leadership turnover affect international conflict? We propose a new theory emphasizing the domestic constraints of new leaders. We argue that leadership turnover induces temporary turbulence, weakening successors who prioritize internal power consolidation before confronting external threats. Compiling a novel dataset of wars and leaders in 17 states during the Spring-Autumn and Warring States eras of ancient China, we exploit the plausible random timing of leaders’ natural deaths to identify exogenous variation in leadership turnover. We find that leadership turnovers decrease the likelihood of initiating interstate wars, while not affecting the probability of foreign attacks. We further provide supporting evidence of power consolidation. Data from 1,337 elites across 10 states during the Spring and Autumn period reveal a negative correlation between the risk of political assassination and a leader’s tenure. This paper illuminates a pivotal episode in Chinese history and suggests that domestic disruptions can unexpectedly foster international peace.

Can succession norms promote autocratic survival? We argue that the institutionalization of vertical succession norms narrows the candidate pool by excluding brothers and cousins from potential rightful successors, which facilitates coordination among the elite and increases the likelihood of agreeing on a successor. Using a novel dataset covering 357 monarchs in 17 states in ancient China during the Spring-Autumn and Warring States eras, we find that the institutionalization of vertical succession norms reduces monarchs' risk of being deposed by the elite. To address the concern of endogeneity, we exploit the ancestral distance of states' founding fathers to the royal families of previous dynasties as an instrumental variable. We further provide evidence that the institutionalization of succession norms works through moderating the adverse effect of elite competition on monarchs’ tenure.