Identifying a clear relationship between rebel group structures and the use of violence faces the challenge that group structures rarely change over time. We exploit the analytical advantage provided by religious holidays to address this issue using the principal-agent framework. Religious holidays serve as a focal point and reduce group coordination costs, but also raise the societal costs of violence. We argue the principal of rebel groups is more sensitive to the increased societal costs than the agents and thereby attempts to restrain the agents from attacking during religious holidays. However, the extent to which these attempts are successful depends on the group’s institutionalization level. We test the theory by first conducting microlevel analysis of Islamic separatist groups in three Southeast Asian countries and then analyzing a cross-sectional sample of Islamic rebel groups. Results show that highly institutionalized groups that have a central command system and control over constituent groups are less likely to attack during long religious holidays than on other days, and vice versa for weakly institutionalized groups.

We investigate the robustness of the Penn effect—the finding that the price level is higher in countries with a higher per capita income—over different samples, measures, and specifications. Testing for the Penn effect has been hampered by the imprecision of the price measures, so that use of different versions of the data set can lead to substantially different results. We find that the price level-income elasticity is fairly consistently estimated across data sets. However, there is some evidence that the relationship is non-linear. For developed economies, the quadratic term implies an inverted U-shaped relationship. Developing economies, on the other hand, display a U-shaped relationship. Estimates of misalignment differ, depending on the choice of specification and data sets. It appears that the Renminbi (RMB) was fairly valued by 2011. In contrast, the RMB’s value was undervalued in 2005, and overvalued in 2014.

This paper examines how informal institutions shape political stability in autocratic regimes by analyzing succession norms in ancient China. We argue that the institutionalization of vertical succession norms (VSNs)—which limit legitimate successors to the monarch’s sons—narrows the candidate pool and facilitates elite coordination in selecting the successor. Using an original dataset of 358 monarchs from 17 states during the Spring-Autumn and Warring States eras (771–221 BCE), we find that VSN institutionalization reduces the likelihood of elite-led deposition. To address endogeneity, we conduct a sub-sample analysis that restricts comparisons to monarchs who inherit personal power from their predecessors and employ an instrumental variable approach based on ancestral distance to royal lineages. We also show that VSNs mitigate the destabilizing effects of elite competition. Our findings contribute to the literature on authoritarian survival and informal institutions by demonstrating that succession rules can promote political stability even before they are codified.

HHow does leadership turnover affect international conflict? We propose a new theory emphasizing the domestic constraints of new leaders. Leadership turnover results in successors who, regardless of their absolute strength, initially face a period of relative political vulnerability. We argue that new leaders prioritize consolidating power—through repression, co-optation, and reforms—before engaging in external conflict. Using a novel dataset of wars and rulers in 17 states during the Spring-Autumn and Warring States eras (771–221 BCE) of ancient China, we leverage exogenous variation in leadership turnover induced by rulers' natural deaths. We find that leadership turnover decreases the likelihood of initiating interstate wars. To further substantiate our theory, we present both empirical and anecdotal evidence of power consolidation strategies during leaders' early tenure. Our findings contribute to debates on the diversionary use of force and the broader role of domestic politics in shaping international conflict.